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Abstract 
Greater uptake of intermodal transport is important in improving efficiency and reducing carbon and other emissions. An alternative 
conceptual model to predict the potential of intermodal freight transport is offered based on flow game theory. Emphasis is placed 
on predicting the potential of establishing modal and operator alliances.  The model is compared to case studies reported in literature 
and was shown to be able to interpret and predict operator strategies and best practices. The paper reframes understanding of 
intermodal transport developments and provides insight to shippers, operators and policymakers alike. 
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1. Introduction 
The promotion of intermodality constitutes the corner stone in achieving modal shift from road to other modes of 
transport and requires the organisation of integrated door-to-door chains, using rail or sea transport for a significant 
part of the total chain, limiting road transport to the pre-haul and end-haul operations. Efforts to understand market 
development drivers have been principally focused on: (1) considering the economics of intermodal freight transport 
(cfr. Blauwens et al., 2006; Janic, 2007; Nash and Sansom, 2001; Panayides, 2002)  (2) transport chain choice based 
on behavioural attributes (cfr. Bergantino and Bolis, 2008; Brooks and Trifts 2008; Daniels and Marcucci, 2007; 
Hensher and Golob, 1999; de Jong and Ben-Akiva,  2007; Paixão and Marlow, 2005; Puckett and Hensher, 2008), (3) 
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policy strategies and measures to improve the supply side of intermodal freight transport (cfr. Bontekoning and 
Priemus, 2004; Bruinsma et al., 2000; Gorman, 2008).  
However, standard intermodal services are associated with the involvement of a substantial number of market-
actors with conflicting strategies and interests, who add to the complexity of the transaction. The promotion of a 
collaborative organisational attitude amongst the various players of the logistics chain has seen little headway, while 
there is evidence of the establishment of big players (cfr. Bruinsma et al., 2000; Foschi, 2007; van der Horst and de 
Langen, 2007; Heaver et al., 2000; Midoro et al, 2005), who may dominate the market leading, possibly, to reduced 
competitiveness.   
The challenge remains the reconciliation of supply-oriented and strategic planning of infrastructures with demand-
oriented provision of transport and logistics services in a competitive environment. Understanding the market on a 
macro (transport sector) level and micro (operator) level is important in projecting future trends and assessing the 
impact policy measures and other external effects (eg. economic crisis) may have.  
The present work aims at providing insight on the drivers of market structure within intermodal freight transport. 
The problem is addressed through a conceptual flow game. This bears a number of advantages the most prominent 
being the fact that the model does not seek to identify equilibrium of supply and demand, or the rationalization of user 
and supplier choices which are system specific but highlights the mechanisms of alliances on a modal level (i.e. 
mechanisms leading to intermodal transport) and on an operator level (i.e. identification of market strategies). The 
objective is to overcome the limitations of specific model development and/or generalisation of conclusions drawn 
from case studies and provide a macro understanding of potential evolutions, their underlining causes and potential 
effects. Consequently, the model may be used as a decision tool for policy makers aiming to minimise the externalities 
of transport activities and players in the logistic chain aiming to secure pay-offs. The flow game is presented in section 
2, along with its interpretation on a macro and micro level. Section 3 reflects on the freight flows in Scotland and 
other reported cases. Final conclusions are drawn at the end. 
2. Logistic Networks and Flow Games 
The application of game theory to transport problems is not novel and researchers have recognised the existence of 
strong connections between traffic assignment principles and game theory. Network games trying to predict user 
equilibrium and/or system optimum have been addressed through the Nash equilibrium as cooperative and non-
cooperative games (cfr. Dafermos and Sparrow, 1969; Harker, 1988; Haurie and Marcotte, 1985; Rosenthal, 1973).  
Interest has also been placed on addressing the combined problem of user equilibrium and system optimum (cfr. Maher 
and Hughes, 1995; van Vuren et al., 1990; van Vuren and Watling, 1991; Yang 1998; Yang et al., 2007). The produced 
game presentations bear the limitations of their originating assumptions and, hence, their scope of application is 
respectively limited.  
The present model bears two distinct differences to previous efforts: (a) it seeks to predict cooperation and 
competitive behaviour through the identification of coalitions formed in order to address the basic question “which 
alliances-coalitions will form” and (b) remains at a generalised (conceptual) level in order to provide policy guidelines 
and predict player strategies.  The model, while investigating the supply side on both a macro (transport modal) and 
micro (operator) level and its feasibility, takes into account, indirectly, the aggregate user utility on the respective 
levels and, therefore, considers both user equilibrium and system optimum. 
2.1. Corresponding flow games to logistic networks  
Games, derived from a flow situation, are called flow games. A flow game in simple terms is a way of sending 
objects from one place to another, but in doing this, the cooperation of players owning network arcs should be used. 
Kalai and Zemel (1982) define a flow game associated to a system of vertices V (often called nodes), which are 
connected by arcs aij, where i z j. The double subscript ij denotes the arc from node i to node j. Each arc has a capacity 
cij. Furthermore, a flow is a vector X = (xij) in which the component xij represents the flow units moving from node i 
to node j. There are two nodes that distinguish from the others and are called the source (s) and the sink (t). There is 
also a finite and non-empty set N as the player set. The arcs are considered as owned by the players. Moreover, a 
coalition owns the arcs of its members. The set of coalitions is denoted C. An n-person cooperation flow game is a 
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function u from the set of coalitions to the set of real numbers. For a coalition S  C, u(S) is defined as the maximum 
flow value for coalition S obtained through the network of its members if it operates on its own. Which means that 
u(S) stands for the maximum flow that S can sustain using its own portion of the network. The function u just defined 
is called the characteristic function of the game. For a game (N, u), the core of u is defined by the set of all n-vectors 
X satisfying )S(uxi¦  for all S  N and )N(uxi  ¦ .  
The constraints imposed on the Core (N, u) ensure that no coalition would have an incentive to split from the grand 
Coalition N, and do better on its own. Meaning that an allocation of u(N) belongs to the Core (N, u) and is stable 
during the cooperation between the players (cfr. Potters et al., 2006; Reijnierse et al., 1996; Shapley and Shubik, 
1971). The above description may refer to “privately” owned arcs, i.e each player owns one arc, or “publicly” owned 
ones, where the arc may be used by more than one player.  
In transportation terms the source and the sink represent the origin (O) and the destination (D), respectively. Arcs 
represent the various legs of the transport chain as well as the transshipment terminals (ports, freight distribution and 
consolidation terminals etc.), which are not considered as nodes in the present conceptualization. This differs to the 
traditional flow formulation of a transport system where terminals are considered as nodes.  In this formulation, 
transshipment terminals are viewed as “legs” in the transport chain with respective flow-rates. In addition, the model 
is analyzed on two levels: (a) transport mode macro level by assuming that the arcs are “privately owned”, i.e. there 
is only one player per arc, and (b) operator micro level where the arcs are “publicly owned”, i.e. there is more than 
one player per arc. Table 1 illustrates the correspondence between flow games and transport networks. 
Table 1. Corresponding flow games to transport chains 
Flow game terms Transport chain equivalent 
Source Origin 
Sink Destination 
Arc 1) Transport leg 
2) Transshipment terminal 
3) An operator 
Flow rate Capacity 
Coalition Transport Chain 
 
The optimum flow rate (Q) of each arc (describing a transport leg, a terminal or an operator) corresponds to the 
optimum freight volume per unit of time that may be transported (transshipped) with reference to the optimum 
generalised cost (see figure 1). More specifically, it is assumed that for every player (transport mode or operator 
depending on the level of analysis) in the transport system there is an optimum flow rate for which the mean 
generalised cost is minimized. Any variation from this optimum, results in increased cost, which is then reflected on 
the price of unit volume transported per unit length. The major assumption to be made in the formulation to follow is 
the fact that each player tends to retain optimum operation (i.e. optimum flow rate) as it is not in his interest to deviate 
from this optimum, which in turn corresponds to a specific minimum generalised cost. The defined optimum flow rate 
will correspond to the players’ “capacity”. 
This assumption forms the corner stone in the development of the conceptual model and reflects the operational 
optimisation of each player in the system. 
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of generalized cost vs flow. 
2.2. The intermodal network at a macro level 
A typical transport chain choice is illustrated in Figure 2 and described in Table 2. More specifically, figure 2 
describes four (4) choices: only road, {1}; road and rail, {2}; road and sea, {3} and road, sea and rail {4}; where {1}, 
{2}, {3} and {4} represent the potential alliances/coalitions formed. Obviously, network “coalitions” {3} and {4} 
describe the integration of SSS in the intermodal chain. The assumptions made and depicted in Table 2 are: 
x All transport chain choices are admissible in game theoretic terms, which in respect to the transport sector refer 
to the distance between Origin and Destination (for example Road is a feasible alternative). This assumption 
focuses the flow game on Short Sea Shipping (SSS). 
x All legs of the same mode have the same optimum flow rate (capacity). For example the road leg of {1} has the 
same capacity with all road legs on {2}, {3} and {4}.  This assumption is obviously not valid, as all roads, for 
example, do not have the same optimum flow rate. However, it is a simplification to the problem, which as will 
be shown later, does not influence the final conclusions. 
The decisive factor of “Time” is included in the flow rate estimation (see fig. 1).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Transport Chain Choice – coalition flow game. 
Figure 2 and table 2 represent the formulation of the problem, i.e. given the general transport chain choices depicted 
which “alliance/coalition” will be more stable or, in transport science terms, which transport choice is considered 
optimum. The solution to the formulated problem is addressed by using game theory and identifying the grand 
coalition and the core, as follows. In transportation terms the grand coalition corresponds to the best transport chain 
choice. 
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As qR (the optimum road flow-rate capacity) is included in all coalitions, it may either be the minimum, hence all 
coalitions have the same characteristic function u(i) = qR or it is not, hence the characteristic function of all other 
coalitions is smaller than that of the road mode. In any case u(1) t u(i)  i  {2, 3, 4}; indicating that the road mode 
forms the grand coalition under the assumption that the capacity of the road network is the same for all roadways.  
For coalitions {2}, {3} and {4} under optimal conditions the arc with the least capacity will be defining the value 
of the coalition (transport chain), hence the other players with greater capacities will try to deviate from this unstable 
coalition as they are required to function under sub-optimal conditions. Therefore, if demand in capacity Q >qR than, 
based on figure 2, this will force the player owning the arc (i.e. the road) to deviate from the optimum and triggers a 
tendency for the instability of the grand coalition, as its value may become comparable with the value of the other 
coalitions. From the opposite stand point, less quantity transferred stemming from a smaller demand, also, leads to a 
deviation from the optimum flow rate and, consequently corresponds to sub-optimal operation and greater generalized 
costs.  
Table 2. Description of transport chain choice-coalition flow game 
N  
 
Modal possibilities for door-to-
door (arcs) 
Nodes Capacity Characteristic 
function of coalition 
u(i) (transport chain 
choice) 
1 Road O-D qOD=qR qR 
2 Road – Transshipment terminal 
(TT)- Rail- TT - Road 
O,1,2,3,4,D qO1=qR  
q12=qT 
q23=qRl 
q34=qT 
q4D=qR 
min {qR ,qT,qRl} 
3 Road – Port – Sea – Port - Road O,5,6,7,8,D qO5=qR  
q56=qP 
q67=qS 
q78=qP 
q8D=qR 
min {qR ,qP, qS} 
4 Road- Port – Sea – Port – Rail –TT 
- Road 
O,5,6,7,8,9,10,D qO5=qR  
q56=qP 
q67=qS 
q78=qP 
q89=qRl 
q910=qT 
q10D=qR 
min {qR  qP, qS, qT,qRl} 
 
Say for Q >qR u(1) < u(i)  i  {2, 3, 4}; stemming from game theory, in the case of u(2) = u(3) = u(4) the coalition 
with the least number of players will prevail as the grand coalition (transport choice), i.e. {2} or {3}. Since both 
coalitions contain the road mode and qs>> qR1 by definition, {3} will form the grand coalition if qp>qT. Hence, when 
comparing intermodal rail and SSS the flow-rate of the transshipment terminals will define the relative strength of the 
respective coalition (transport chain). If demand exceeds the optimum flow-rate then respectively the value of the 
“new” grand coalition is reduced as there is deviation from the optimum and, consequently, other coalitions become 
comparable. 
In conclusion, when evaluating the alternative grand coalitions (transport chain choices) on a macro level the 
relative value of flow-rate in the network, under the assumption that all road mode infrastructures have the same 
optimum flow-rate is: 
62   Athena Roumboutsos /  Transportation Research Procedia  1 ( 2014 )  57 – 66 
 
u(1) > u(2) >or < u(3) >u(4) for  qR(1)= qR(2)= qR(3)= qR(4)      (1) 
 
Considering that the function q shown in figure 1 is a formulation of the Pareto front of the correlation of flow-rate 
versus generalized cost for the respective road infrastructure, it is evident that the assumption stated above does not 
hold true. However, as roads serving as central transport routes have most likely optimum flow-rates greater than or 
equal to roads serving transshipment centers (i.e. qR (1)t q(i)   i  {2, 3, 4}) the above formulation is strengthened.  
A final consideration and comparison stems from the understanding of the assumption  qS > qR > qR1 > qP > qT in 
connection with demand flows. If volumes to be transferred are lesser than those leading to optimum capacities, than 
the specific carrier will be operating at sub-optimal conditions and, thus, sub-optimal generalised costs. 
2.3. Alliances at a micro level 
The network micro level concerns the individual transportation/transhipment operator (provider). For each provider 
there is a characteristic generalised cost – flow-rate function dependent on operational characteristics of the individual 
operator. When considering the transport leg each operator services within the network, the following relation exists: 
, where Xij corresponds to each operator’s respective flow-rate. 
More specifically, the flow-rate of the ‘arc’ from node i to node j is equal with the sum of the flow-rates of all 
operators servicing the ‘arc’ and is bounded by the total capacity (optimum flow rate) of the mode.  
If  then all or some operators will be operating sub-optimally. 
Hence, indicating a zero-sum game amongst the operators serving the same arc (leg) of the coalition (transport 
chain). With reference to the macro level argumentation developed previously, when considering the entire flow, 
qoptimum of the transport chain is equal to the minimum flow-rate of all arcs involved. Therefore the zero-sum game 
formulated for each coalition (transport chain) described in figure 2, as follows:  
{1}: u(1)=qR;   {2}: u(2)=qT;  
{34}: SH3(N,u)+ SH4(N,u) = ; 
 
While each operator, within the above constraints aims to optimise its individual Xij. In addition, the above 
formulae intrinsically state that Xij is maintained throughout the coalition – transport chain. Hence, each operator in 
order to optimise its cost function needs to: 
x Optimise its Xij 
x Indulge in a non-cooperative zero-sum game with other operators serving the same arc (leg), and 
x Identify and collaborate with operators on adjacent arcs (legs) who have individually or in summation 
equal optimum flow-rates. 
x Evidently, a grand coalition is shot based on the minimum number of members that will achieve the 
optimum characteristic function. 
3. Discussion on Findings and Implications 
A central finding of section 2, is that on a transport modal level (macro level) deviations from the road grand 
coalition may be expected with changes induced to the flow rate of the arcs (legs). On a micro level, arc (leg) capacity 
is irrelevant as operators’ optimize their anticipated pay-offs by forming coalitions/alliances with equal flow-rate 
operators on adjacent arcs (legs).  These are illustrated in the following. 
¦t i ji j Xq
o p t i mi j qX  ¦
¦ i jR Xq ¦ i jT Xq
pT qq 1 21 143  ¦  i jpT Xqq 1 21 143
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3.1. Intermodal chains and observed strategies 
The value of intermodal transport is reflected in the ability of the various actors to coordinate activities in the supply 
service chain. Researchers and practitioners have attempted to describe/categorise and theorise the coordination 
problem, while simultaneously trying to forecast strategic behaviour. Alliances and merges have been the predominant 
characteristic of deep-sea shipping extended to hinterland services through subsequent alliances, merges and joint 
ventures and dedicated port operations (cfr. Gouvernal and Daydou 2005; Heaver et al., 2000; van der Horst and de 
Langen, 2007; Robinson, 2002; Slack and Frémont, 2005; Slack et al., 2002).  When analysed, several approaches 
have been used ranging from transaction costs to strategic management, while the volatile nature of these alliances 
has been highlighted as being inherent (Mirodo and Pitto, 2000).   
The flow game offers a different explanation: Short duration agreements (trial-and-error) are followed by longer 
agreements, which assist the individual actors in partnership to improve on individual and total performance. However, 
once individual performance is improved, the optimum flow-rate may (and should) change making the “coalition” 
suboptimal and leading to the observed instability.  
Finally, concerning ports served Slack et al. (2002) conclude that “Numbers of vessels have increased, but more 
significant has been the increase in vessel size. Individual carriers are serving more ports than ever. On the other 
hand, the total number of ports served has remained remarkably stable.” This is not surprising from the perspective 
provided by the model. The emphasis in the coalitions/alliances is to optimize the service supply chain with equal 
capacity optimized generalized costs of collaborating operators. Once this is achieved there is no need to deviate only 
to increase capacity, the maximum being the optimum flow-rate of the port arrangement.   In this aspect, the new port 
paradigm proposed by Robinson (2002) is supported. 
3.2. Freight flows in Scotland 
The “Food Port” project, funded under the Interreg IVB North Sea Region Programme (Transport Research 
Institute, 2012) with the specific aim of developing the North Sea Region as the best food cluster and hub in Europe 
for food products delivered via an efficient and sustainable transport system, concerned a review of the Scottish food 
freight flows movements to identify major food transport corridors across the North Sea Region. This study (2012) 
followed a bottomǦ up approach and was designed to gain inǦ depth knowledge of the inter and intra regional food 
product flows and receive insights into the willingness to participate in an innovative logistics concept with its focus 
on (horizontal) collaboration between (competing) shippers. Figure 3 presents the key freight flows of the major 
production in Scotland: fish and whiskey.  The two categories have significantly different characteristic needs. The 
first concerns small production and requires continues flow. The second concerns large productions and flows that 
may be interrupted. 
According to the respective Food Port Report (Transport Research Institute, 2012), transport of the Scottish fish 
products mainly relies on road haulage for both domestic movements and international exports (figure 3). Much of 
the fish landings at the North and West Coast are loaded onto trucks for transport to Aberdeenshire for further 
processing. On the East – West sector, in contrast, most shellfish landed on the East Coast, together with Shetland 
salmon delivered by the Shetland-Aberdeen ferry services, is transported to Glasgow by different haulers. The main 
distribution routes on the North – South direction are toward processors and distributors in Humberside (for secondary 
processing or onward sale), London’s Billingsgate market (mainly whitefish resale) and the continent (e.g. France, 
Spain, Germany and Italy). Movement within the UK is effected through distribution nodes at places such as Glasgow, 
Manchester, Birmingham, Humberside, London and Bristol. 
Whiskey has no preconditions in delivery. Production is transported from distilleries to bottling and packaging 
centres in the Central Belt area (Glasgow, Livingston and Fife). Concentrated qualities use more than one mode of 
transportation, including road, rail and sea freight, with rail playing an increasingly important role in domestic 
transportation and in reaching deep –sea vessel ports (figure 4). 
According to the proposed model, this trend is anticipated for both product movements. In the first case, small fish 
quantities can only be matched by the qR and the quantities are smaller than for and other “arc” making the road the 
“grand coalition”. In the case of the Whiskey movements, qR is smaller than the quantities to be transported and flows 
are matched with coalitions representing larger capacities (qR1 and qS). 
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The Report also registered willingness towards logistics vertical and horizontal co-operation (scale 0 -5). Vertical 
co-operation referred to co-operation between producer, logistics provider and traction provider whereas horizontal 
referred to co-operation between different producers sharing the same logistics chain. With respect to horizontal co-
operation both fish and whiskey producers scored very low (below 1). According to the model this is to be expected 
as in both cases quantities are such that any divergence would lead to sub-optimal conditions and competition between 
producers for capacity. More specifically, fish production in Scotland seems to be stable (if not on the downturn), 
hence the probability would be for more “road”, as this would reflect the less capacity needed. According to the 2011 
statistical report, whiskey exports reached record high (in 2011) and this trend will be topped in 2013, according to 
the Scottish Whiskey Association. Hence, horizontal co-operation would only introduce a competitive situation 
between agents sharing the same logistics chain. Again, this would be sub-optimal to the current (and anticipated) 
situation. 
 
Fig. 3. Map of fish product flows - Source: Synthesis Report of Freight Flow Mapping – Scotland Part (Transport Research Institute, 2012) 
4. Conclusions 
An alternative approach to predicting the potential of intermodal freight transport was presented. The conceptual 
model offered is based on a flow game where the emphasis is not on maximizing utility or optimizing transport system 
characteristics but on the potential of establishing modal (on a macro level) and operator (on a micro level) alliances.  
Solutions were shot based on game theory principles and not by solving specific models which may limit the 
conceptualization of the problem.  
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The model was validated by comparing findings with case studies reported in literature and was shown to be able 
to explain and predict operator reported strategies and best practices. It is also interesting to note that the model implies 
more “road” in cases where there is a decline in transportation capacity needs. 
This representation presents a distinct advantage to other more traditional approaches which focus on either the 
demand side or supply side of the problem, as this approach is based on neither, but looks at the problem on its 
potential to create stable alliances and co-operations either between transport legs (described as a macro level) or 
between operators (described as a micro level).  Hence, on the macro level it may provide evidence on how to provide 
support measures and what the potential impact might be, while on the micro level it provides insight on what 
operators’ strategies might be. A further development to the model should include reverse-logistics, as this condition 
would extend its applicability and ability to interpret and foresee market strategies. 
 
 
Fig.4. Map of scotch whiskey flows - Source: Synthesis Report of Freight Flow Mapping – Scotland Part (Transport Research Institute, 2012) 
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